I. INTRODUCTION
The Administrative Litigation Law of 1989 embodies the rule of law ideals to an exceptionally large extent, and its enactment attracted substantial attention and expectation. 1 At the early stage of implementation of this legislation, Professor Gong Xiangrui and his fellows conducted systematic field research and underscored a number of problems in its implementation. 2 American scholars such as Kevin O'Brien researched into administrative litigation in China's rural areas and also painted a bleak picture for us. 3 These studies, mainly based on various interviews and surveys, depict a strong impression on the audience, but they are apparently unable to supply empirical evidence on the national scale. Professor Pei Minxin may be one of the few scholars who have made an in-depth analysis based on the national data. 4 However, his research, covering only the years of 1986-96, did not correlate the main indicators (case number and their dispositions) with the policy factors behind them and failed to provide a dynamic picture of administrative litigation in China over the past decades.
Among other data, the high rate of withdrawal cases and its high volatility remained a "puzzle" for many. The Chinese legal circle for a long time has had different attitudes towards withdrawal in administrative litigation.
In recent years, coordination and settlement in administrative litigations are even advocated in the official directives.
Will withdrawal, or "coordination and settlement" as so-called, be a way to go out of the predicament in judicial review, or is it merely a result of such predicament.
This paper seeks to first review the withdrawal, a particular institution in administrative litigation, as the vantage point, then to demonstrate and analyze the difficulties that the institution of administrative litigation faces with national statistical data (1987- ', 51 CHINA J. 76, 75 (2004) . 4 Pei Minxin, Citizens vs. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 China Q. 832 (1997) . TSINGHUA CHINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:257 2010), articles and reports written by judges and interviews, and ultimately to reveal the current state of administrative law in China. My conclusion corroborates the prevailing scholarly opinions on the practice of administrative litigation and emphasizes that the lack of judicial independence is the main cause of the difficulties in administrative litigation.
II. THE GAP BETWEEN INSTITUTION AND REALITY

A. The Well-Intentioned Statutory Rules
According to the Administrative Litigation Law (hereafter "the Law") of China, mediation is unsuitable for administrative cases, but plaintiffs may opt for withdrawals.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs' applications for withdrawal must be reviewed and approved by the court. Article 51 of the Law states that "before the people's court makes a ruling or determination in an administrative case, the plaintiff may apply for a withdrawal, or when the defendant changes its concrete administrative act the plaintiff may consent to and apply for a withdrawal; whether to approve such an application or not shall be subject to the discretion of the people's court." In either of the above scenarios, "if the people's court determines that a withdrawal should be disallowed, and if the plaintiff refuses to appear in court," the court may rule in abstentia.
5
Both the Administrative Litigation Law and the relevant judicial interpretations emphasize the requirement that all withdrawals must be approved by courts. Although it was not until the publication of the Rules on Several Issues in Withdrawals of Administrative Litigation by the Supreme People's Court that conditions for withdrawals by plaintiffs were explicitly laid out, 6 it is many 5 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (最高人民法院关于贯彻执行中华人民共和国行政诉讼法若干问 题的意见)(试行) [Opinions of the Supreme People's Court in Regard to Certain Issues in the Implementation of Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by Adjudication Comm. Sup. People's Ct., Jun. 11, 1991 , effective Jul. 11, 1991 Jan. 14, 2008， effective Feb. 1, 2000 art. 2 (Chinalawinfo) ("When the defendant changes the concrete administrative act that is being challenged, and the plaintiff applies for a withdrawal, the people's court should approve the application, when the following conditions are satisfied, 1) the application for withdrawal is an expression of the applicant's true will; 2) the defendant changes the concrete administrative act that is being challenged, and it does not violate any prohibitive scholars and judges' conviction that a court may approve an application for withdrawal only if certain conditions are met. In general, the court exercises not only procedural review of a plaintiff's application for withdrawal, but also substantive review, including whether the plaintiff's application is made voluntarily, and whether the challenged administrative act or the changed administrative act is legal. 7 Therefore, in administrative litigation, the court is not an umpire that is completely neutral and passive; on the contrary it bears the duty to correct illegal acts and to preserve the order of administrative law.
Although the majority of scholars point out that the review of and the restrictions on withdrawal serve the twin purposes of safeguarding citizen's rights against the harm of illegal acts by administrative agencies and safeguarding public interests against the harm of illegal acts by either a plaintiff or a defendant, the overriding purpose of the restrictions on withdrawal is undeniably to protect the interests of the plaintiff. Given the vulnerable position of the plaintiff in administrative litigation, litigation cannot proceed further once the plaintiff is coerced to withdraw, thereby frustrating the legislative purposes of protecting the plaintiff' interests and monitoring administrative acts. Therefore, it is necessary for a third party -the court -to intervene to correct the imbalance of power between the plaintiff and the defendant in order to ensure the continuation of administrative litigation.
B. The Law is Rendered Illusory
While the Law requires the court to be a vigilant gate-keeper in the review of applications for withdrawal, the number of instances of withdrawal is astonishingly high in reality. Based on Table I , since the enactment of Administrative Litigation Law, the national rate of withdrawal in administrative cases in first instance has never fallen below 30%. It reached its peak at 57.3% in 1997. According to the reports by a number of administrative law judges, the rate of withdrawal once surged to a staggering level of 81.7% in certain regions.
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Compared with the data recorded prior to the enactment rules in statutes or regulations, or exceed or abdicate its delegated power, or harm public interests or other individuals' legal interests; 3) the defendant has already changed or has decided to change the concrete administrative act that is being challenged, and it notifies the people's court in writing; 4) no third party expresses dissent."). , not only did the rate of withdrawal in administrative cases not decline after the enactment, but on the contrary, it grew steadily over a long period of eight years, and still remains consistently high today (the rate slightly dropped after 1998, but it has always remained higher than the pre-enactment level). Hence, it is impossible to discern any real contribution from the legislation. (1996) . 9 The source of the data is the Statistics Division of the Office of Research of the Supreme People's Court (最高法院研究室). Some of the data for the years from 1988 to 2009 are also found in China Law Year Book (中国法律年鉴). When there are discrepancies among the data from different sources for some of the years (e.g., the number of accepted cases in 1998), this paper relies on the data supplied by the Statistics Division of the Office of Research of the Supreme People's Court.
"Cases Accepted" does not include administrative cases that were raised solely for administrative compensation before 2001. "Rule for Plaintiff" include rulings revoking or modifying administrative acts, rulings compelling administrative agencies to carry out their legal duties, and rulings recognizing that the administrative acts in question were either illegal or void. "Rule for Defendant" include rulings upholding administrative acts, rulings recognizing that administrative acts in question were legal or effective, and rulings dismissing plaintiffs' complaints. "Other Means of Concluding (Others)" includes determinations that dismiss, terminate, or transfer suits and other means through which cases are concluded without determinations on the merits, and this category does not include withdrawals.
In its judicial interpretations issued in 2000, the Supreme People's Court added the recognition of the dichotomies between legal and illegal, void and effective, with regard to administrative acts. However, it was not until 2002 that the pertinent data began to be collected. It is probable that such cases were included among "Others" in prior years. Since the proportions of rulings involving recognitions have been very small (e.g., in 2007, rulings recognizing acts to be illegal or void amounted to 1.6%, and rulings recognizing acts to be legal or effective amounted to 0.4%), so the impact of such rulings on statistical results is insubstantial. With regard to the rate of withdrawal, which is the focal point of this paper, there is a high level of consistency among the data provided by various sources. The source of the data is the Statistics Division of the Office of Research of the Supreme People's Court (最高法院研究室). Some of the data for the years from 1988 to 2009 are also found in China Law Year Book (中国法律年鉴). When there are discrepancies among the data from different sources for some of the years (e.g., the number of accepted cases in 1998), this paper relies on the data supplied by the Statistics Division of the Office of Research of the Supreme People's Court.
"Cases Accepted" does not include administrative cases that were raised solely for administrative compensation before 2001. "Rule for Plaintiff" include rulings revoking or modifying administrative acts, rulings compelling administrative agencies to carry out their legal duties, and rulings recognizing that the administrative acts in question were either illegal or void. "Rule for Defendant" include rulings upholding administrative acts, rulings recognizing that administrative acts in question were legal or effective, and rulings dismissing plaintiffs' complaints. "Other Means of Concluding (Others)" includes determinations that dismiss, terminate, or transfer suits and other means through which cases are concluded without determinations on the merits, and this category does not include withdrawals. In its judicial interpretations issued in 2000, the Supreme People's Court added the recognition of the dichotomies between legal and illegal, void and effective, with regard to administrative acts. However, it was not until 2002 that the pertinent data began to be collected. It is probable that such cases were included among "Others" in prior years. Since the proportions of rulings involving recognitions have been very small (e.g., in 2007, rulings recognizing acts to be illegal or void amounted to 1.6%, and rulings recognizing acts to be legal or effective amounted to 0.4%), so the impact of such rulings on statistical results is insubstantial. With regard to the rate of withdrawal, which is the focal point of this paper, there is a high level of consistency among the data provided by various sources.
More noticeably, since the enactment of the Administrative Litigation Law, few courts have handed down rulings that denied applications for withdrawal. Among all the articles on withdrawal in administrative cases that this author has read, no paper has ever mentioned even one concrete case in which withdrawal was denied. This author has discussed the issue with several senior judges from the administrative divisions of the Supreme People's Court and a few high courts and intermediate courts. A number of them stated that they had never heard of such cases; some stated that there might have been one or two such cases in certain provinces, but such cases were certainly extremely rare.
Viewing in abstract, both the grant and the denial of withdrawal are consequences of the exercise of courts' power of review, so legal rights of the plaintiff are protected to the same extent in both scenarios. However, once the actual circumstances in a withdrawal case are considered, a different picture emerges. For the purpose of statistical analysis, the cases withdrawn by plaintiffs are divided into two categories, "withdrawals on plaintiffs' own" and "withdrawals filed by plaintiffs after the defendants revoke or modify the challenged administrated acts." While in the latter category, a plaintiff wins the suit de facto, a plaintiff ordinarily gains no benefit at all in the former case. As Table I suggests, since the data became available in 1993, the proportion of "withdrawals on plaintiffs' own" among all withdrawal cases has remained above 50% every year. The rate has since then continued to rise and even exceeded 90% in recent years.
The above analysis suggests that the court's power to review withdrawals in administrative cases has been rendered entirely illusory, and the legislative intent of the restrictions on withdrawals in the Administrative Litigation Law is completely frustrated.
C. Concerns and Contradictions
The high rate of withdrawal in administrative litigation was already noted even during the period between the promulgation and the enactment of the Administrative Litigation Law. constant increasing rate of withdrawal in administrative cases brings increasing concerns and pleas regarding the issue of withdrawal in the mid-1990s. Some articles employed the term "abnormal withdrawal" to describe the phenomenon. In their investigation into the root of this problem, almost all authors pointed to the court's failure to act as a good gatekeeper as an important contributory factor, and when discussing potential solutions to this problem, almost all authors urged the court to heighten scrutiny over applications for withdrawal and deny those applications that fail to meet the conditions for withdrawal.
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The widespread concern over the issue of withdrawal in administrative litigation not only demonstrates the expectation that judicial scrutiny should correct the imbalance of power between plaintiffs and defendants in administrative litigation, but also reflects the predicament of the institution and the disillusion in reality. In light of the legal rules, the authors urge in good faith that the court should heighten the scrutiny over applications for withdrawal. However, judges, probably even including the authors of those articles, take a lax approach to withdrawals in light of the reality. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to have so few rulings that deny withdrawal. Laying before us is the enormous gap between the law on paper and the law in reality.
道民) eds., 1991). For scholarly works, see Zhang Shuyi (张树义) & Tang Yongjin (汤永进), Zai Jiannan Zhong Qianjin: Zhonghuo Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa Shishi Xianzhuang Yu
A substantial amount research has revealed that the court not only simply rubber stamps the application for withdrawal filed by the plaintiff, but it even sometimes tries to convince plaintiffs to withdraw.
12
There have been instances of the court asking an agency to make certain concessions as conditions for the plaintiff's withdrawal, and in absence of any concession from the agency, instances of the court attempting to sway a plaintiff by bluntly informing him that "if you do not withdraw, you will lose the case". In one extreme case, the court even expressly encouraged promised the plaintiff to withdraw his case: "as long as you withdraw, we will return all of your litigation fees."
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In order to circumvent the rule that mediation is inapplicable in administrative litigation, the court internally refers to its conduct as "coordination," which is in effect mediation without the use of a written mediation agreement affixed with the seal of the court.
Nonetheless, it may be unfair to attribute all the blame to the court's failure to scrutinize withdrawals according to the law. When the court attempts to convince a plaintiff to withdraw, the court may be motivated by external pressure, a desire to improve its relations with an agency or the fear of "negative social implications." Whichever the actual motivation, the court's approach can be regarded as a strategy to preserve its authority by making concessions, given the dilemmas it faces in its precarious position. A court that is vulnerable and lack of judicial authority is incapable of offering much protection to litigants and exercising supervision on the agencies.
III. IN BETWEEN HIGHER COURTS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The analysis conducted so far has not taken account of the role of the higher courts as a factor. In practice, the higher courts have adopted various policies to improve the conduct of administrative litigation, and these policies seem have had some real-world effect. To illustrate the relationship between judicial policy and the rate of withdrawal more comprehensively, this paper adopts a wider perspective and examines the influence of judicial policy on the 12 See Zhang (张), supra note 11; see also Graph I allows a number of observations to be made. First, the number of administrative cases in first instance (including both the number of accepted cases and of closed cases, which were roughly of the same amount) grew continuously from 1987-2010; marked growth was recorded rapid in certain years (e.g., 1991, 1995-96) ; the number declined slightly in some exceptional years (e.g., 2000, 2002) . Second, the rate of withdrawal in administrative litigation was, however, volatile; the rate rose continuously before 1997; there was a clear decline a few years later, but the rate rebounded in recent years. Such salient changes are noteworthy.
A number of explanations, based on the responses of local courts to both local governments and higher courts, can be given for the observations identified above. Local courts faced particularly strong pressure from local governments and higher courts, and their actual capacity to adjudicate administrative disputes and protect citizens' rights -hereby defined as "judicial capacity" -was severely constrained. However, local courts were also obligated to respond to the demands made by higher courts to a certain extent. The clash of the two conflicting forces resulted in the wax and wane of the number of cases and the rate of withdrawal.
A. No Case for the Administrative Division to Adjudicate
Compared with its pre-enactment level, the number of administrative cases doubled in 1991. The impressive growth may be reasonably attributed to the Law's enactment in October 1990, which expanded the scope of administrative actions that were cognizable in court and enhanced awareness of administrative litigation among the general public. However, the Legislature's expectation of excessive inflow of administrative cases did not materialize. In the three subsequent years, the number of accepted cases hovered around the 1991 level. In each of the three years, there were over 20,000 administrative cases across the entire nation, leaving each court with less than 10 cases on average. Some local courts even encountered no administrative case at all over an entire year, leaving its administrative division in a prolonged recess. Some courts allowed their administrative divisions to adjudicate cases such as divorce and private prosecution crimes, while others even abolished their newly established administrative divisions.
Compared with the level in 1990, at the time of enactment of the Administrative Litigation Law, the rate of withdrawal for administrative cases did not rise significantly over this period. During the early period of the Law's enactment, the court probably rejected the more difficult cases and instead only accepted cases that it could handle with confidence.
14 As a result, there were relatively few instances of the court having to persuade a plaintiff to withdraw due to practical difficulties in handing down a judgment.
B. Raising the Number of Accepted Cases
The lack of administrative cases undermined the legitimacy of the nascent institution of administrative litigation and threatened the status of administrative law judges as an emerging professional group. As a result, this problem attracted widespread concern and discussion in the judicial system. Within the judicial hierarchyfrom the Supreme People's Court to the local courts -it is not hard to find reports and speeches that urge the courts to boldly accept cases and widely expand the sources of cases. In October 1993, the Supreme People's Court held the Second National Judiciary Conference on the Adjudication of Administrative Cases, during which the Deputy Chief Justice pointed out that "Currently, there are few administrative cases in some regions . and an important reason is the failure of many courts to accept cases that should have been accepted . . . This problem must be solved with forceful measures." Therefore, all levels of courts must "actively and boldly accept cases according to the law and reduce the difficulties in bringing administrative suits."
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In addition, the directors at some local courts and intermediate courts also emphasized that "whether a court can accept cases boldly is currently the primary benchmark for whether the law can be persistently and strictly applied in administrative adjudication, and it is also the quintessential sign of whether the court has made substantial breakthrough in administrative adjudications."
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When it comes to the operation of the institution, the courts of certain regions took a large number of measures. Most notably, anumber of provinces established quota for the amount of accepted cases at every level. Since 1992, Hunan Province has conducted evaluations of administrative adjudication in the entire provincial judicial system. In addition, it has also established official competitions among local courts, aiming at no more than 100 administrative cases every year for each court.
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Among all the courts, the performance of Intermediate Court of Huaihua City is illustrative. That court places the chief judge in charge of administrative trials, and for a period of time, it conducted internal competitions to encourage progressive practices. "Each local court is assigned a baseline number for its administrative cases based on the geographic size and population of its jurisdiction. The court's performance is graded on a scale of 100. . The score is also one of the criteria in deciding whether directors and presiding judges receive promotions."
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Within a short period of time, "to raise the number of cases" became the most prominent slogan in administrative adjudication as well as the overriding goal for local courts. It hardly needs pointing out that different regional courts employed different tactics. While some actively solicited eligible cases 20 , others split joinders and class actions into discrete cases according to the number of individual plaintiffs. Some decided to withstand pressure and boldly accepted difficult cases. The most convenient approach was, however, to accept a case as soon as a party filed the lawsuit. Based on Haidian District Court of Beijing City's experience in actively accepting cases and persistently expanding the sources of cases, "after adopting the rule of separating acceptance and adjudication, whenever we . are not immediately sure of whether a case is an administrative case or nor, we accept the case first and make a determination when adjudicating the case. Through this approach, a stable source for administrative cases is established".
21
The rapid increase in the number of accepted administrative cases as shown by the statistics reflects the effectiveness of these measures. large number of these cases. Since such cases are beyond the court's judicial capacity, the more cases the court accepted, the lower the proportion of the cases that are concluded with judgments (including judgments that uphold, revoke, or modify administrative acts). This rate declined continuously from 56% in 1990 to its lowest point of 27.4% in 1997. When the court found itself incapable of issuing a judgment, it had to resort to alternative methods, such as dismissing the suit or terminating the adjudication. As such the most common method was, undoubtedly, to persuade a plaintiff to withdraw. According to one study, in face of a difficult case, the court occasionally employed delay tactics, such as declining to hold a session, to issue the judgment or even to record the case, until the plaintiff withdrew.
Graph II. National Percentage Distribution of Various Methods of Concluding Administrative Cases in First Instance
C. Reducing the Rate of Withdrawal
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The growth of withdrawal rate became noteworthy, as the rate exceeded 50% after 1995.
The high withdrawal rate alarmed the higher courts. The Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court in charge of administrative adjudication repeatedly expressed his concern about the exceptionally high withdrawal rate in his speeches at internal meetings of the judicial system. While he did not object to the use of coordination per se, he emphasized that the court should issue judgments boldly, and that the court should not, in an unprincipled manner, urge a plaintiff to withdraw.
Since 1995, the concern about the high withdrawal rate has been frequently discussed in speeches by directors and official reports of the court. Jilin Province recounted its experience, "In early 1997, the provincial high court specifically issued a directive, in which the courts, especially the local courts, were strictly required to maintain the withdrawal rate below 30%. In addition, satisfaction of this requirement became an important condition in awarding honors. . The withdrawal rate of administrate cases in first instance in our province declined from 48% in 1997 to 26% in 1998, and the rate was 28% in the first eight months of 1999".
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While there are only a few sources that recount courts' solutions to the concern of high withdrawal rate, the above-mentioned method probably represents the typical approach.
After 1998, the withdrawal rate fell substantially, and the percentage of cases that were concluded with judgments rose slightly. These changes can be explained as the consequences of the judicial policy aiming to reduce the withdrawal rate.
D. A Hydraulic Relationship
The judicial policy appears to have generated an impact, but the picture becomes less rosy if two other changes are also taken into consideration.
First, there was an abnormal decline in the number of accepted cases in the following years. Several reasons could be identified to account for the drastic decrease in the number of accepted cases in 2000. 26 Nonetheless, the following reason should not be excluded: when faced with difficult cases, the court could no longer always resort to the old tactic of persuading plaintiffs to withdraw. Given the little discretion vested with the courts and the greater difficulties in handling the cases, some courts have closed their doors on difficult cases, which was another old tactic. 26 One of them might be the enactment of the Administrative Reconsideration Law in October 1999, which precluded administrative litigation in a few areas. Article 30 of the Law provides that when the State Council or a provincial government makes a decision to apportion, adjust, or take natural resources, reconsideration by the provincial government to confirm ownership rights or usufruct rights within its jurisdiction constitutes the final authority.
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Second, contrary to our reasonable expectations, while the difficult cases are often denied, the percentage of cases that conclude with judgments failed to significantly increase. On the other hand, other means of concluding, such as dismissal and termination of adjudication, have been widely explored. In 2002, cases that were concluded with "other means" accounted for approximately ¼ of the total number of administrative cases. Among them, the percentage for dismissed suits, i.e., the cases which the court had already accepted but later pushed away, reached a record high of 15.2%. Such cases are counted towards the number of accepted cases and the number of concluded cases. Under the double pressure with respect to the number of accepted cases and the withdrawal rate, the court regarded dismissal as an ideal solution. However, the general public would regard administrative litigation not only as window dressing, but also a trap.
After several rounds of struggle, the system seems to have reached equilibrium in the 2002-2006 years. Since 2002, the number of administrative cases has remained around 100,000, while the withdrawal rate on the national level has stabilized at around 30%. In 2006, the Chinese courts concluded a total number of 95,052 administrative cases in first instance, which only accounted for 1.8% of the over 5,180,000 cases concluded by the courts in that year. On average, each local court handled only around 30 administrative cases. Even among these cases, 33.8% ended up as withdrawals.
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The above analysis of the relationships among the number of accepted cases, the number of concluded cases and the withdrawal rate is telling. There has been little improvement of the institutional environment for administrative litigation, weak judicial independence and authority as well as limited judicial capacity. As a natural consequence, courts often resort to withdrawal as the solution to the challenges that arise in individual cases. The higher courts and the administrative judges who were concerned about the legal practice emphasized that courts should engage in self-reflection and urged all levels of courts to strictly apply the law. Their efforts seem to have exerted appreciable influence over the local courts with respect to such issues as the number of accepted cases and the withdrawal rate. However, the courts often face a hydraulic relationship and fail to make improvements on the fundamental level. Even where administrative means was employed, significant achievements were difficult to obtain.
In the absence of fundamental changes to the judicial system, the actual function of the administrative litigation is bound to be limited.
IV. THE " COORDINATION TURN" IN ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION
For a sustained period of time, while coordination had been widespread within the judicial system, this mechanism failed to receive formal recognition. Given the legitimacy deficit, judges frequently facilitated coordination but rarely advocated it explicitly. Since 2006, there has been a shift in the trend away from the previous approach, which gave little acknowledgment to the contribution of coordination, towards one of regarding coordinated settlement as the "new mechanism" through which courts handle administrative cases.
Notwithstanding the long recognition of the merits of coordination by some judges, it was the policy determination by the central government that directly led to the resort to coordination in (2006) 27 (The full content of this directive has not been disclosed, and the state-operated media seems not have reported on it. Nonetheless, the main content of this directive can be inferred from the reports on the implementation of this directive by local administrative agencies and courts).
Disputes," 29 and it subsequently issued several directives. First and foremost, with regard to collective disputes over administrative acts in such areas as the taking of rural lands, the demolition of urban buildings, corporate reorganizations, labor and social benefits, and environmental protection, local courts were asked to "make best efforts to resolve the disputes through coordination," 30 or "to employ coordination to the greatest possible extent."
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Under the slogans such as "Harmonious Justice" and "Great Mediation," the Supreme People's Court specifically issued a directive to encourage the use of mediation in litigations. According to the directive, the court should "encourage the parties to reach a settlement;" in addition, the court should keep experimenting with innovative methods to settle litigations and continue perfecting the mechanisms through which administrative cases reach settlements.
32
To institutionalize these adjustments in judicial policy, In the form of judicial interpretation, the Court expressed formal approval of the use of coordination in administrative adjudication. In particular, Article I provides, "when the people's court determined that the concrete administrative act under challenge was illegal or improper, it may suggest the defendant to modify its concrete administrative act." On August 18, 2008, the Supreme People's Court issued "The Methods of Evaluating the Conduct of Administrative Adjudication (Provisional)". According to this evaluation mechanism, the rate of appeals and the rate of motions for retrial are categorized under the negative factors, but the rate of withdrawal is categorized under the positive factors, which further incentivizes judges to take advantage of coordination to resolve administrative cases.
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Meanwhile, a small number of local courts even formulated specific policies to encourage and incentivize judges to resolve administrative cases through coordination. For example, in early 2006, the High Court of Liaoning Province issued a notice which incorporated the percentage of administrative cases that conclude through coordination as one of the factors in "The Comprehensive Evaluation Method for the Conduct of Administrative Adjudication." As a result, there was a dramatic increase in the percentage of administrative cases that were concluded through coordination in this provincial judicial system. Sup. People's Ct, Jan. 31, 2008 , effective Jan. 31, 2008 ) art. 2, 2008 SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 19. 34 According to sources, the system of evaluation includes the following factors: factors relating to adjudicating individual cases, which are scored according to the conditions of cases that have been randomly selected; statistical data relating to the quality and the efficiency of adjudications, including the rate of appeals, the rate of amending rulings after retrials, the rate of adjudications exceeding the time limit, the rate of petitions, and the time period for case concluding, etc; factors relating to social influence and social perception, which may either increase or decrease the total scores; and anticorruption factors with regard to the judges. 35 pointed out that the practice of coordination would be widely adopted to resolve administrative litigation, and that the court system should make its greatest efforts to raise the rate of withdrawal in administrative cases in first instance above 50%.
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The High Court of Hunan Province discussed its experience in the National Judiciary Conference: "Bring the coordination of administrative cases within the scope of ordinary work; make the success rate for the coordination of administrative cases an important factor in evaluating the conduct of administrative adjudication by intermediate courts and local courts . directly link these evaluations with the mechanisms of awards and sanctions."
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Under the pretext of experimenting with coordination mechanisms, new means of coordination have often emerged. One such means was unheard of in the past, but it has become wide spread in recent years: even when the administrative act is clearly flawed, if the defendant promises not to take any enforcement action after coordination, the court upholds the administrative act and the plaintiff does not appeal. Even though such mechanisms may allow the plaintiff to obtain some real benefits, the legality of coordination is out of the question. In exceptional cases, the administrative agency does not keep its promise but the court finds itself powerless to intervene; the judiciary becomes an object of ridicule. Leaving aside the few successful stories, it is often called into question whether coordination can afford substantial protection of the plaintiff's rights, or effective resolution of social conflicts. According to the data provided by the Supreme People's Court, in the past 5 years, the withdrawal rate of administrative cases in first instance maintained above 1/3; the cases in which the defendant voluntarily revoked or modified the initial administrative case 36 account for less than 10% of all withdrawal cases. Besides, the rate of rulings in favor of plaintiff has fell to lower than 10% in the past two years (2009) (2010) , a figure that has never been recorded in the history of judicial review in China.
It is hard to deny that a few official judicial directives and speeches by high level judicial officials emphasize that the conduct of coordination should be consistent with the principles of legality, voluntariness and restraint, that the power of coordination should not be abused, and that the court is forbidden to coerce withdrawals, or to induce settlements through delay. 38 In practice, these policy concerns are, however, muted by the clamor for coordination, and they can hardly constrain judicial practice in any meaningful sense. There has been a corresponding shift in the approach taken by the state-controlled media. The previous concerns about the high withdrawal rate in administrative litigation have been abruptly taken over by praises of coordination. judges have largely shifted their attention towards legitimating coordination in administrative litigation. 40 The intent of this paper is not to categorically reject the use of coordination in administrative litigation, nor to articulate the legal limits of coordination. The question is not whether the law should authorize mediation or coordination, but whether the judiciary is capable of shouldering the duties conferred by the law. Mediation per se does not necessarily harm the plaintiffs' interests or the public interests, and thus the prohibition of mediation does not necessarily protect the plaintiffs' interests or the public interests. Even though both the rule that mediation is inapplicable to administrative litigation and the requirement that applications for withdrawal must be reviewed still stands, the court no longer emphasizes handing down rulings according to the law, or makes mention of the review of withdrawals. Instead, it emphasizes coordination. The resort to coordination in administrative litigation was partially animated by the intent to remedy the court's alleged obsession with the law at the expense of social consequences. However, the primary reason was that given the lack of judicial independence and authority, the court had no other alternatives. When the entire judicial system is singing praises of coordination, the court gives up not only its power of adjudication, but also its struggle to overcome the challenges in administrative litigation. Facing the fatal institutional defects, the judges collectively compromised, and the judicial ideals behind the requirement that withdrawals must be reviewed were lost.
V. CONCLUSION
The Administrative Litigation Law of China paints a rosy picture in which the individual and the government face each other in court, both submitting to the judgment of the law. Through litigation, adversarial relationships between individuals and the government are established within the legal system, and the legality of administrative acts is formally questioned. The court's determination of the legality of an administrative act, especially its declaration that an administrative act is illegal, both incentivizes the administrative agencies to govern according to the law and perfects the system of administrative law.
In reality, however, such adversarial relationships are often not concluded through the court's rulings. Instead, they are concluded owing to the withdrawals of the plaintiffs. The abnormal withdrawals have not only left the plaintiffs' legal rights unprotected, but they have also rendered illusory any potential contribution that litigation might have towards the goal of governance by the law. As an institution, the review of withdrawals has met its defeat in China's reality, which reflects the general challenges facing administrative litigation.
Courts' encouragement of coordination may be partly motivated by judicial philosophy, but it is primarily a collective compromise that courts have made in face of such challenges. The lack of judicial authority is the crucial reason for the ineffectiveness of the review of withdrawals. If the court were to truly exercise its power to review withdrawals, the court's independence must be guaranteed. Otherwise, the review of withdrawal is out of the question, and the challenges in administrative litigation would never be overcome. With regard to these challenges, the Supreme People's Court issued a directive in November 2009 and pointed out that the failures of administrative litigation have resulted in increased number of petitions and irrational behaviors, which severely undermine social stability, and
2011]
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However, it is questionable whether this directive would meaningfully protect the citizens' right to sue, in addition to triggering changes to the statistical data for administrative cases. The debate does not end here. Administrative litigation in China is deeply embedded in its contemporary social and political structure. The judiciary cannot correct the administrative abuses single-handed while effective mechanisms that constrain the administrative power are fundamentally lacking in the society. Furthermore, the judiciary is unlikely to enjoy independence and authority if no fundamental change is made to the social and political structure. Before any radical change is made, the judiciary continues to occupy a precarious position; its development is still fraught with difficulties, and its contribution to social changes also remains considerably limited. The Administrative Litigation Law announces the rule-oflaw ideals, yet it has failed to become a means for China to establish constitutional governance.
To eliminate the obstacles to administrative litigation, the judicial institutions themselves need to be improved but the substantial progress depends on the growth of civil society and the perfection of democratic politics. 
